Introduction
Griffin in his book 'Well Being' claims that we should see desires as normatively subordinate to what is good. It is only reasonable, Griffin says, to desire what is desirable, valuable or good 2 Unfortunately, as I will try to show, what we could reasonably want ourselves to desire if we were fully informed does not match what we intuitively think is part of our well being. Either our intuitions or the desire based theory of well being must be abandoned.
. Since on such view what it is reasonable to do or to desire is determined by what is good, we must have an independent notion of what is good. But the history of philosophy is paved with failed attempts to find such independent notion of goodness. It is the despair generated by these failures that led major philosophers from Hobbes onward to invert the order of priority and base what is good on what we desire.
According to the simple desire based view to say that something is good for someone is to say that the person desires it. One central problem with the simple desire based view is that we are sometimes uninformed and then our desires are based on a mistaken picture of the world and of ourselves in it. Railton tries to improve on the simple desire based view. He suggests that we should base our understanding of value only on well informed and rationally generated desires. Why? Because these are the desires that we should want ourselves to have. What is valuable, on this view, is what we could reasonably want ourselves to desire if we were fully informed.
In the first part of this paper I briefly trace the dialectic leading to the formulation of Railton's view and present some famous criticisms made against his view. In the second part I consider four possible interpretations of his view and argue that only one of these can provide us with a coherent and determinate understanding of well being. In the third part I argue that this fourth interpretation clashes with ordinary intuitions about well being.
The Simple Desire Based View, Railton and Critics
Consider the following formulation of the simple desire based view as an analysis of the notion of well being. According to this analysis:
A: 'x is good for me (x is part of my well being) iff I desire x'.
It is easy to see that this analysis fails. I may desire to take a very strong drug not knowing the negative long terms effects of the drug. In this case what I desire is certainly not what is good for me.
Full information theories try to provide a more sophisticated analysis of well being in terms of desires in order to deal with this type of counterexample. The basic thought behind all full information theories is that we have to understand well being not in terms of what the agent desires, but in terms of what she would desire if she had the relevant information. Thus we get:
B: 'x is good for me iff I would desire x were I to be presented with full information about x and the implications of bringing about x'.
It is often claimed that as stated in 'B' full information views are incomplete.
Information about the objects of one's desires is insufficient. One has to be informed about all possible alternatives in order for one's desires to be well grounded 3 .
Furthermore being exposed to relevant information is not enough. I may be the kind of person who is not capable of understanding or of processing the information properly and thus I may not absorb the 'lesson' of the information to which I was exposed. Therefore full information theories ought to require that well being be determined by my desires only if I am properly informed and only if I am given the capacity to understand the information to which I am exposed 4 3 I am not sure this criticism is cogent, but this is a topic for another paper.
. However talking of 'the capacity to understand information' may not be sufficient either. In order to form a significant desire about which one of two movies to see, merely having information about the movies and being able to understand this information is not going to suffice either. I also need to know what effect the two movies would have on me. Only someone who experiences the movies could know what effect the movies have on him. Finally I must be rational so that the desires that I form will be rationally grounded in my other desires and the information that is available to me.
Full information theories can accommodate these additional requirements. For example a full information theory can claim that: 104, no. 4 (1994): 784-810. 7 At least with all the forms of life and personalities available to me. 8 Rosati and Sobel's objections are much more nuanced and detailed -but I take it that this is the gist of it. 9 What I will come to see as the only coherent version of Railton's view can avoid Sobel and Rosati's argument. I will not, however, discuss this in the current paper.
Rosati also presents a different objection to fully informed desires views. Her objection is based on the assumption that full information theories wish to respect the requirements set by motivational internalism. One demand set by motivational internalism, says Rosati, is that "The information that you would desire X for yourself under the specified conditions [the conditions of full information] will have pull for you, even if X itself still fails to move you 10 ", or maybe in a less stringent form that the "… 
Four interpretations of Railton's view
The following example will help clarify the discussion. desires that the AS desires. Thus the fact that the FIS and the AS are the same person is relied on not because the desires of these two counterparts of the self are identical but rather because the proponent of the model hope that a person will have some good will towards his hypothetical counterpart. What we are really asking the FIS is to take his own desires for himself as a base, and perform the appropriate adjustments to fit the circumstances of the AS given his good will towards him. But this exercise requires the application of some standards in order to determine what is the right adjustment to perform, and the advice model does not supply them
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The fact that we are asking the FIS to apply certain standards or perform an adjustment as part of the procedure that determines what is good for the AS is itself not . 16 The worry here is similar to a worry discussed by Rosati as part of her argument from internalism. See: Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.", p. 312.
unproblematic,
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One seemingly appealing answer to this problem is that the FIS is supposed to want his AS to want everything that he wants for himself minus those things that the AS is not going to enjoy. For example, the FIS wants fancy wine for himself, because he has experienced many good wines and developed a fine pallet, but he knows that the pleasure that the AS (whose pallet is not as sophisticated) is going to get from that wine is not worth its price. So he does not want the AS to want the fancy wine. The problem is that this way of explaining what the 'appropriate adjustment' is, relies on the very concepts we are trying to analyze -those of pleasure and well-being.
but I want to focus on a more basic problem. The problem is that it is just unclear what kind of adjustment the FIS is supposed to make in order to move from his own desires to the desire he would like his AS to have.
What could be the standards that should govern the advice of the FIS?
We should certainly require that the advice of the FIS would be reasonable. The desires the FIS should want the AS to have should be desires she has good reason to want the AS to have. Since the FIS is supposed to be fully rational you might think that this requirement will already be trivially satisfied. This is doubtful since the FIS is supposed to be instrumentally rational and as we have seen instrumental rationality will only ensure the satisfaction of the goals of the FIS, goals that may not match those of the AS. In any case, we shall make the requirement explicit.
1. The reasonability constraint: Any interpretation of the advice model should be constrained by the requirement that the advice of the FIS would be reasonable.
This constraint does not, however seem sufficient. It is not clear, at least not on the face of it, whether merely in virtue of being fully informed and fully reasonable the FIS will be benevolent or will care about the actual self's autonomy. Therefore in order to get a satisfying theory of well being we might need to impose further desiderata on the nature of the FIS' desires. We might want to add, for example that the FIS will be benevolent. But to add this constraint will make our analysis circular. Being benevolent is 17 The problem is that the initial impetus for a fully informed desires view of well being was the thought that by appealing to the desires of my FIS we are replicating the desires that someone like me would have with regard to a certain object but under improved epistemic conditions. It now turns out that we are appealing to a different process altogether -one that presupposes independent normative standards.
intending to promote in one's actions the well being of the person towards whom one is benevolent. If we allow the notion of benevolence into our understanding of the nature of the FIS we thereby include the notion of 'well being', the very notion we set out to analyze in the first place.
I will, therefore, focus here on a different desideratum. We must assume that the FIS will not want to rob the actual self of her autonomy. The FIS must want for the AS only desires that the AS could come to have without loosing her autonomy.
There are two problems with this suggestion. First what autonomy is, is under great dispute. And second, one might think, that autonomy is just one among many goods that the FIS should want for the actual self and that the FIS should at least balance the goal of ensuring the agent's autonomy with the a concern for the maximizations of these other goods
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To answer the first problem we have to find a minimal constraint that will be acceptable to most views of autonomy. I suggest the following constraint:
.
The advice of the FIS should be in principle justifiable to the actual self. If the FIS cannot explain why it makes sense for the AS to adopt the FIS' advice then it shouldn't be given. Of course, the actual self may not be in a position to understand the justification, but the justification must be such that it could be in principle intelligible to others who the AS has good reason to trust. Advice that cannot be justified even in principle to someone with sufficient information and who the AS would be rational to trust, loses its status as advice and becomes an imposition. And for that to be the case, the FIS should at the very least, be able to justify the advice to herself. Advice that she cannot justify even to herself is advice that she could not, even in principle, justify to the AS. Thus the autonomy constraint and the reasonability constraint seem to partially converge. The reasonability constraint is a pre-condition for the satisfaction of the autonomy constraint.
2. The minimal autonomy constraint: Any interpretation of the advice model should be constrained by the requirement that the FIS should not give the AS any advice which the AS could not even in principle reasonably accept. Where 'an 18 Thanks to Elijah Millgram for pressing me on that point.
advice can be reasonably accepted in principle' if there could be someone that the AS reasonably trusts that could see the justification for accepting the advice.
As for the second problem those who raise it have a point. It is often worth it to
give up some of your autonomy in order to achieve other goals or other goods. We can however accept the central insight behind this objection while maintaining our minimal autonomy constraint: we say that it is legitimate for the FIS to advise the AS to act in ways that will harm her autonomy as long as the FIS can justify that loss of autonomy.
Finally any interpretation of the advice model should give us a determinate understanding of the agent's well being. To see the importance of this third constraint it is important to remember that on Railton's view we do not have direct access to one's nonmoral good. We do not have a characterization of non-moral good in terms of either the state of the world that constitutes such good or the mental states that constitute non-moral good. The way to the content of one's non-moral good is oblique. We describe a procedure whose outcome, whatever it ends up being, determines one's non-moral well being. But for such oblique characterization to work the procedure must be determinate. What is good for my fully informed self is often good for her only because she has capacities, knowledge and experiences that I do not have. However on the second interpretation the two will coincide. We must therefore also reject this interpretation.
A different approach must be sought. Maybe my FIS is not just supposed to want me to have certain desires but rather is supposed to want me to have these desires after I am told that my FIS wants me to have them. What my FIS wants is that I would want to have certain desires when it is disclosed to me that these are the desires he wants me to have. Call this view the 'Disclosure Advice Model' or for short 'DAM'.
Third interpretation
F: x is good for me iff my FIS while considering my circumstances and assuming that I know that he wants me to desire x, would want me to desire x.'
This suggestion does solve some of the problems mentioned above. If I believe that my FIS wants me to have certain desires, and assuming that I want to have whatever desires my FIS wants me to have, and that I am reasonable, it is quite possible that I will naturally come to have these desires. So it's not crazy, even for an FIS who does not want to impose on me a psychological rift, to want me to have them under these conditions.
However we now see that this interpretation as well as the first two does not satisfy constraint number 1, in fact these interpretations do not address in any way the concern that led us to accept the first constraint. All three interpretations appeal to the desires of the FIS without specifying in any way the standards under which these desires should be adopted. As I claimed above such standards are clearly needed. The FIS must ask herself not only what she desires for herself or for the actual self, but also what she should want the actual self to want given what she desires. To answer this question she must appeal to some justifying standards that will determine whether or not it is reasonable for her to desire that the actual self have certain desires.
When we combine the lesson that pushed us toward DAM and our reasonability and minimal autonomy constraint we get the following condition:
Fourth interpretation
An FIS must only desire for his AS desires that it would be rational for the AS to adopt if he learns that his FIS wants him to adopt them.
Whether it is rational for the AS to adopt a desire when he learns that his purported 21
From the point of view of the FIS things look thus: we are asking my FIS to think
what desires she could want me to want if a. she thought of herself as being in my shoes and if b. the list of desires she wanted me to adopt were constrained by the condition that it would be rational for me to adopt them if I learnt that she wants me to have them. Thus when my FIS deliberates whether to desire that I desire x or not, she cannot just stipulate that I will adopt any desire she wants me to adopt. If, concerning some desire for x that my FIS wants me to have, it is irrational for me FIS wants him to adopt it, depends at least on whether he can understand the justification for adopting the desire, or at the very least on whether there could be anyone that the AS might reasonably trust that could understand that justification. 
G: 'x is good for me iff my FIS while contemplating my circumstances, and assuming that I am informed that she wants me to desire x, could reasonably want me to desire x, which depends on whether she could have good reasons to think that it would be
21 Whenever I talk of the FIS as seen from the perspective of the AS I will qualify the term with the word 'purported'. As we will shortly see unless the AS has good reason to think that a piece of advice he gets is indeed reasonable he has reason to doubt that this advice originates from the FIS. 22 In the sense described above.
rational for me to adopt the desire for x if I thought that she wanted me to have it, which in turn depends on whether she could provide me or someone I could trust with a justification for adopting the desire for x.'
We should now consider our last interpretation of DAM (G). 
Considering G
i. Lack of instrumental relation
Assume for now that we do not doubt that the FIS had the experience she claims to have had when she tasted the vanilla ice-cream. The question is whether that experience can serve as the basis for justifying her desire that I desire to have the same ice cream?
The relation between one's experiences and one's preferences for oneself is not a But the FIS must seek a normative justification before she gives advice to the AS -and therefore cannot ground her advice in her experiences. An objector might argue against this conclusion thus: if the vanilla ice-cream is tastier to the FIS than the chocolate one, then it would be tastier to the AS if she had tried it. And if the FIS prefers it over chocolate that means that the AS would have preferred it over chocolate if she would have tasted both. What more does one need in order to show that the AS would be reasonable in adopting the advice of the FIS to want the vanilla over the chocolate?
This simple argument masks the important assumptions upon which it is founded.
23 When I want A and my experience teaches me that the best way to achieve A is by doing B then my experience (given my previous desires) exerts normative pressure on me. 24 Or so we would think if we adopted a desire based view of well being. 25 See footnote 24.
On one interpretation the argument attempts to forge normative connections between the experiences of the FIS and his recommendations for the AS by an implicit reliance on a constant desire of the AS for pleasure. On that interpretation the experiences of the FIS reveal that this desire for pleasure can be satisfied. But part of the appeal of a desire based view of well being is its ability to give content to the slippery notion of pleasure of hedonistic or utilitarian views of well being. Indeed what the desire based view attempts
to clarify is what it is for something to be part of one's pleasure or well being. But then a reliance on the notion of pleasure in the analysis would render the view circular.
Alternatively the objector might try to rely, not on the experiences or the pleasure of the FIS, but rather on the fact that the AS herself would have preferred vanilla to chocolate if she had had the same experiences. However in doing so he fails to recognize the fact that since the relation between the FIS' preferences and her own well being is a constitutive relation it cannot exist when the preferences are not present. Since the AS does not form similar preferences her well being cannot be similarly constituted. The situation is different in cases in which the information available to the FIS can be linked via a means-ends relation to the preferences of the AS. In these cases one can rely on the preferences of the AS to constitute her own well being, and the information available to the FIS only helps specify preferences that exist independently.
We can now return to the question with which we started this section. Could I have good reasons for thinking that my purported FIS is justified when she desires me to have a certain kind of ice-cream? The answer is that since my FIS can have no justification for wanting me to have vanilla over chocolate, I could have no reason for believing that she is justified in wanting me to have the preference for vanilla over chocolate.
The first limitation, then, is on preferences whose basis is in experiences that cannot be linked to the existing goals of the AS or with goals the AS should have. Only experiences that are relevant by way of means-ends reasoning to the goals of the AS (or the goals that the AS should have) could ground the justification of the advice of the FIS.
ii. Some experiences are not publicly verifiable I will now consider a third limitation on the desires of my FIS concerning my desires.
iii. Changes in the preferences of the FIS
A desire based theory of well being is necessarily a dynamic theory of well being.
What is good for me now may not be good for me tomorrow. If, on the other hand, the FIS' preferences for the AS stay fixed, they do not vary with his own preferences. In itself this is not a problem since we have been assuming all along that not everything that the FIS wants for himself he will want his AS to want.
However once we realize that the preferences of the FIS for his AS cannot vary with his own preferences and cannot even be based on preferences of the FIS that may vary over time, we must revisit the basis for the FIS' advice to the AS.
There is only one type of preferences that the FIS could have for the AS that will not change as his own preferences for himself change. Preferences whose grounds are the combination of the actual preferences of the AS (or the preferences he should have) and publicly available information about the means for satisfying these preferences. The fourth interpretation offers us a coherent and determinate account of one's non-moral good. But as I will argue in the remaining section, the account of well being offered by the fourth interpretation fails to match our intuitions about one's non-moral good. As an analysis of our pre theoretical understanding of non-moral good it may need to be rejected.
A clash with intuitions
Our starting point was the realization that many of one's actual desires cannot determine what is good for her. We were looking for a theory that would deliver an amended set of desires hoping that this amended set would capture our intuitions about the notion of well being. We have investigated Railton's view, considered how best to interpret it, and discovered what states of affairs it deems part of one's well being. Call the set of the desires a person would have, had she adopted the desires her FIS wanted her to have under the fourth interpretation (G) of Railton's view S*. What we want to know is whether the states of affairs desired by the desires in S* constitute a person's well being? One way to go about answering that question is to ask whether S* captures our pre-theoretical intuitions about well being.
Let us consider an example: I am in a mood for an action movie. I want to see the most recent Bond movie. My FIS saw the movie. He had a terrible time. I ended up seeing it too and had a terrible time. I got out and wished I saw a good drama instead.
Indeed if the inner workings of my mind were slightly different and I would have wanted to see a drama, and I went to see one, I would have had a great time. But things were not different and I went and saw an action movie that as it turned out I didn't enjoy even one little bit. Not, mind you, because it was a bad action movie, as far as action movies go it was perfectly all right -rather because the experience of watching it made me -as I was watching it -want to watch something more sophisticated, more subtle, less violent.
Going to see that action movie was not, we tend to think, part of the best life I could have had. Seeing a good drama would have been much better. My FIS has exactly the same thought. He says to himself 'the life my AS had was not the best life he could have had'.
But could he reasonably have wanted me to want to see the drama. 3. If we choose to reject our current intuitions concerning well being and to revise our conception of well being in light of the fourth interpretation of Railton's view offered above we impose the following limitation on the concept of well being:
what is good for us must be determined either by our current desires or by the set of desires we have good reason to come to have. What desires we have good reason to come to have will be determined by the combination of our current stable desires and policies, and information that is, at least in principle, publicly available.
. 28 27 I take it that Railton's view is the best developed analysis of well being in terms of fully informed desires currently on the market. I therefore tentatively suggest that our investigation teaches us something general about the relation between well being and what could reasonably be desired by a fully informed agent. 28 The question of how should an agents change intrinsic desires in light of pressure from other intrinsic desire and new information is an extremely complicated question and deserves a discussion of its own. My formulation in the text is not intended to support any specific view about norms for changing intrinsic desires. It is merely intended to indicate that some such changes could be reasonably demanded. For examples of cases in which changes in intrinsic desires would be justified see my "Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason", Philosophical Studies 119 (3):265-294.
